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2012.12.0Abstract Since patients with acute poisoning may present as emergency cases, delayed transfer or
inappropriate management may lead to serious deterioration of cases.
The objective of the study: To assess the performed basic management and transportation of poi-
soned patients, and their impacts on the outcome of the referred patients to the Poisoning Treat-
ment Center (PTC), Ain Shams University Hospitals, in Cairo in 2008.
Methods: The medical ﬁles of all referred cases to the PTC, in 2008 were reviewed. Inappropriate
management or transfer was recognized according to the basics of standards of care and principles
of medical ethics in emergencies and on the basis of the Guideline of College of Physicians & Sur-
geons of Manitoba for interfacility emergency transportation. Correlation coefﬁcients and Chi
square tests were used for statistical comparison of frequency between the different groups.
Results: Seventy-nine cases (13.5% of the referred cases) were designated as inappropriate transfer
which included inappropriately managed cases either with incorrect medications (50.6%) or withensic Medicine & Toxicology,
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2 M.K. El Masry, S.M.S. Azabfaulty measures for resuscitation or decontamination (15.2%), referred cases after unjustiﬁed long
delay time (>6 h) (22.8%), cases that did not receive ﬁrst aid measures (21.5%), inappropriately
transported cases (86.1%), referred cases while risks of transfer outweighed its beneﬁts(3.8%),
and referred cases without sufﬁcient documentation of the received management in the referring
hospital (87.3%).
Conclusion: The several defects encountered in this study are related to poorly designed emergency
care systems including ignored continued medical education and training, negligent emergency med-
icine practice and unsuccessful scientiﬁc communications with the PTC.
ª 2012 Forensic Medicine Authority. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Despite the dedicated efforts of emergency physicians to up-
hold Hippocratic Oath, which counsels us to ‘‘ﬁrst, do no
harm’’, we now recognize that thousands of patients die each
year, and many more suffer long-term injuries incurred while
seeking healthcare services due to inadvertent harm and iatro-
genic injury. Over the past century, the potential to do harm
had increased dramatically, not only because of the negligence
or incompetence of care providers, but also because the system
in which they work has become so highly complex and poorly
designed.1
Since patients with acute poisoning may present as emer-
gency cases, iatrogenic errors in the ﬁrst aid and resuscitative
measures, medications, clinical approaches, procedures and
transfer often complicate the course of the cases with poison-
ing. Iatrogenic errors and breach of the therapeutic and ethical
guidelines result in worsening of the patient’s clinical condition
and outcome.
The Poisoning Treatment Center (PTC), Ain Shams Uni-
versity Hospitals, Cairo, is the ﬁrst and largest tertiary care
center in Egypt for emergency management of poisoning cases.
It works as a separate entity from the hospital as it is provided
with a separate emergency room (ER), a 7-beds intensive care
unit for management of poisoned critical cases and an
inpatient department for management of non critical cases.
The center is supplied as well with a toxicology laboratory
for screening and monitoring of the relevant drugs or poisons.
Almost 20,000 patients, are received in the center yearly from
Cairo and other governorates, the farthest, Aswan, being at
1000 km distance from Cairo. Advices on the ﬁrst aid
measures and therapeutic guidelines have been repeatedly
released to the public and medical profession in our scien-
tiﬁc meetings and in the Media for avoidance of such
complications.
The objective of the study is to assess the performed basic
management and transportation of poisoned patients, and
their impacts on the outcome of the referred patients to the
Poisoning Treatment Center (PTC), Ain Shams University
Hospitals, Cairo in 2008.2. Methods
The medical ﬁles of all referred cases to the PTC, Ain Shams
University Hospitals, in 2008 were reviewed by two reviewers
who were completely independent of the physicians who re-
ceived and managed the cases. Inappropriate management or
transfer was recognized according to the basics of standardsof care and principles of medical ethics in emergencies and
on the basis of the Guideline of College of Physicians & Sur-
geons of Manitoba for interfacility emergency transportation.2
Selected cases with inappropriate management or transfer in-
cluded the following:
(1) The risks of transfer outweighed the beneﬁts and interest
of the patient.
(2) Inappropriate management including:n Neglecting appropriate life-supportive measures de-
spite its availability in the referring hospitals.
n Faulty maneuvers of decontamination method and/
or resuscitative measures
n Incorrect medications and antidotes.
n Unjustiﬁed long delay (>6 h) in the provision of the
proper management(3) Lack of effective ambulance regarding;
n Availability of an ambulance
n Requirement of life-supporting devices as ventilator
and cardiac monitor during ambulance
transportation
n Availability of a physician or an expert team to escort
critical cases.
(4) Insufﬁcient documentation of the received management
in the referring hospital.
Poisoning severity score (PSS) was applied after admission
to PTC for grading of the severity of poisoning according to
clinical features.3 This system includes ﬁve grades which were
described as the following;
n None (grade 0): no symptoms or signs related to poisoning.
n Minor (grade 1): mild, transient and spontaneously resolv-
ing symptoms or signs.
n Moderate (grade 2): pronounced or prolonged symptoms or
signs.
n Severe (grade 3): severe or life-threatening symptoms or
signs.
n Fatal (grade 4): death.
The data of selected patients were reviewed for demo-
graphic details (age and sex), type of the poison, time delay
(time passed till proper management was obtained in the
PTC), poisoning severity score, location of referring hospital,
type of inappropriate decision, duration of hospitalization in
the PTC, complications and outcome.
Collected data were tabulated. Correlation coefﬁcients and
Chi square tests were used for statistical comparison of fre-
quency between the different groups.
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In 2008, the number of poisoned patients transferred to PTC
from different medical institutions was 584 cases which repre-
sented 3% of the total number of received patients (19,085).
After reviewing the received management in these hospitals
and conditions of transportation, it was found that 79 cases
(13.5% of the referred cases) were designated as inappropriate
transfer.
Table 1 shows the errors in the management of cases of
acute poisoning in relation to the grades of poisoning severity
score (PSS). A signiﬁcant correlation of poisoning severity
score grades was evident with unjustiﬁed long delay
(r= 0.94), faulty maneuvers in decontamination procedures
or in resuscitation (r= 0.63) and multiplicity of errors in man-
agement (r= 0.99) while incorrect medications and omission
of ﬁrst aid measures did not correlate with PSS grades. Table 2
shows the distribution of cases with fatal outcome (with PSS
grade 4) and survivors (with PSS grades 1–3) among the differ-
ent categories of inappropriate management measures.
Incorrect medications included mistreatment with atropine
in 21 out of 40 cases. Iatrogenic atropine poisoning was the
presenting problem in seven cases of organophosphorous
insecticide poisoning. Atropine was misused for neuroleptics,
salicylates, phosphide and cyanamide poisoning. Other incor-
rect medications included furosemide, antihistaminic, incorrect
antivenom, aminophylline, proton pump inhibitors and non-
indicated intravenous ﬂuids in 18 cases.
The conditions and errors of transportation of the selected
cases are classiﬁed in relation to the PSS grades in Table 3.
Inappropriate transportation was evident in 68 out of 79
patients. Risks of transfer outweighed its beneﬁts in three
patients referred from hospitals in other governorates where
they received the required supportive managements.
Inappropriate transportation included deﬁciently equipped
ambulance reported in 5 cases. In 4 cases, patients wereTable 1 Errors in the emergency management correlated with the P
PSS I
N= 8
Incorrect medications N 3
% 37.5%
Unjustiﬁed Long Delay (>6 h) N 1
% 12.5%
Omission of ﬁrst aid measures/medicines N 1
% 12.5%
Faulty (Decontamination/ Resuscitation) maneuvers N 1
% 12.5%
Multiple errors in emergency measures N 2
% 25%









N % N % N
Survivors (PSS I, II, III) 5 8 3 4.8 34
Fatal (PSS IV) 2 12 2 12 6transported with endotracheal intubation with inadequate ven-
tilation on Ambu bag, and were cyanosed; three of these pa-
tients were apneic on arrival to the PTC. The ﬁfth case was
in respiratory distress and failure secondary to pulmonary
edema resulting from carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning
who did not receive any management during ambulance
transportation.
Inappropriate transportation was as well found in 14 criti-
cal non escorted cases, 8 cases of which had greatly compro-
mised vital functions (shock, cyanosis or respiratory failure)
on arrival to the ER in the PTC. Severe metabolic acidosis
(pH: 6.9; HCO3: 9 mmol/L) was evident in one case and
poisoning-induced complications (coma, convulsions, agita-
tion or cobra induced paralysis) were recorded in ﬁve cases.
Unassisted shock (in 6 cases) and respiratory failure (in 13
cases) during transportation were observed in 19 cases.
Ambulance was not available in 4 cases and not used for
transportation despite its availability in 37 cases. In almost
half (8 out of 17) of the fatality cases (PSS grade 4), ambulance
was not used for transportation, three of which were in shock
and had cardiopulmonary arrest on arrival to ER (two pa-
tients) or during the transfer (one patient). Risk of error calcu-
lated by the number of errors generated per patient strongly
correlated with the poisoning severity score (r= 0.91).
Table 4.) shows a signiﬁcant difference in the distribution of
types of transportation errors between survivors (PSS grades
1–3) and fatal cases (PSS grade 4) (X2 = 293.9 – P< 0.0001).
A high correlation existed between PSS grades and both
cardiovascular instability (r= 0.93) and respiratory distur-
bances (r= 0.96) (Table 5.). Cardiopulmonary arrest during
or before transfer was documented in 12 cases (4 cases with
PSS grade 3 and 8 cases with PSS grade 4); almost half of these
cases were successfully resuscitated while the other half
presented in ER with shock or respiratory failure. A highly
signiﬁcant increase in the inappropriate management was doc-
umented in patients with PSS grade 4 compared with survivorsSS grades.
II III IV Total
N= 18 N= 36 N= 17 N= 79
11 20 6 40 r= 0.12 NS
61.1% 55.5% 35.3%
4 8 5 18 r= 0.94 S
22.2% 22.2% 29.4%
5 7 4 17 r= 0.48 NS
27.8% 19.4% 23.5%
3 4 4 12 r= 0.63 S
16.7% 11.1% 23.5%








Long Delay (>6 h.) Total
% N % N % N
54.8 13 21 13 21 62
35 4 23 5 29 17
Table 3 Types and number of errors of Transportation in relation to PSS of intoxicated cases transferred to PTC.
Poisoning Severity Score (PSS) Total no. of errors
I n(%) II n(%) III n(%) IV n(%)
Inappropriately transported by Ambulance
Deﬁciently Equipped 2(7.1) 3(20) 5
Not escorted by physicians 3(17.6) 8(28.6) 3(20) 14
Unassisted Respiratory Failure 10(35.7) 3(20) 13
Unassisted Shock 1(3.6) 5(33.3) 6
Not Transported by Ambulance
Ambulance not available 1(12.5) 2(11.8) 1(3.6) 4
Ambulance Available but not used 7(87.5) 12(70.6) 10(35.7) 8(53.3) 37
Total number of transportation errors 8 17 32 22 79
Total number of inappropriately transported patients (Risk of error) 8(1) 17(1) 28(1.15) 15(1.46) 68 (r= 0.91)
Number of Properly transported patients 1 8 2 11
Total number of patients 8 18 36 17 79
Table 4 Types & frequency of transportation errors in relation to the mortality (PSS IV) and survival (PSS I, II, III) of the
inappropriately transferred cases.
PSS IV (I, II, III)
N % N %
Deﬁciently equipped Ambulance 3 13.6 2 3.5
Ambulance Not escorted by physicians 3 13.6 11 19.3
Unassisted Respiratory failure in Ambulance 3 13.6 10 17.5
Unassisted Shock in Ambulance 5 22.7 1 1.75
Ambulance Not Available 4 7.0
Ambulance not used for transportation 8 36.4 29 50.9
TOTAL OF ERRORS 22 99.9 57 99.9
X2 = 293.9 – P< 0.0001
Table 5 Appropriateness of the cardiovascular and respiratory managements in relation to PSS grades.
I, II, III IV Total
N % N % N
Cardiovascular Management Appropriate Management 6 46.1 2 10 8
Inappropriate management of Shock and other CVS aﬀection 7 53.9 8 90 15
Total 13 100% 10 100% 23
X2 = 42.5 – P< 0.0001
Respiratory Management Appropriate Management 6 23.1 1 7.7 7
Inappropriate respiratory management 20 76.9 12 92.3 32
Total 26 100% 13 100% 39
X2 = 33.3 – P< 0.0001
4 M.K. El Masry, S.M.S. Azab(PSS grades 1–3). The proportion of transported cases in non-
stabilized cardiopulmonary conditions was signiﬁcantly in-
creased in non survivors (82.4%) in comparison to survivors
(51.6%).
All patients (n= 10) presenting with cardiovascular com-
plications in PSS grade 4 (fatal cases) were in respiratory fail-
ure as well. Respiratory complications occurred in all
inappropriately managed patients with kerosene, benzene or
opiates. Patients with kerosene poisoning had fatal outcome
secondary to severe aspiration pneumonitis, ARDS andrespiratory failure. Respiratory complications affected also 5
out of 6 patients poisoned with carbon monoxide (two of
which died) and 10 out of 16 patients with organophosphorus
insecticides poisoning (3 of which died).
Referral documents were not available in 69 out of 79
improperly transferred patients. History and pre-transfer man-
agement were retrieved from the accompanying family mem-
bers and/or by contacting the transferring hospital.
Non-signiﬁcant differences in the number or in the severity
of the cases (PSS grades) (X2 = 5.874; p= 0.1179) were noted
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and those from distant departments (more than 40 km dis-
tance, n= 38 patients), concerning the errors in management
and transportation.4. Discussion
Patient transfer should be limited to situations in which the pa-
tient’s emergency medical condition has been stabilized, the
medical beneﬁts of transfer outweigh the possible risks, follow-
ing an informed consent from the patient and following an
agreement between transferring and receiving hospitals
approving the transfer being within its available capacity.4 It
is essential that a systematic approach be followed in the pro-
cess of patient transfer; starting with the decision to transfer,
through the pre-transfer stabilization, and then the manage-
ment of the transfer itself. This will involve all the stages
including skilled evaluation, communication, documentation,
monitoring and treatment.5
Regarding transfer decision, this study depicted three cases
in which risks of transfer outweighed its beneﬁts. The decision
to transfer must not be taken lightly. It has the potential to ex-
pose the patient and transferring staff to additional risk, re-
quires trained personnel, specialized equipment and a
vehicle, and may result in an additional expense and worry
for care givers and relatives.5 Medical expertise and therapeu-
tic guidelines of emergency care, should therefore be consid-
ered in making this decision including proper administrative
and medical transfer procedures and a major need for commu-
nication with the PTC prior to transfer.
Although transfer is potentially associated with additional
risk to patients, it can be safely accomplished even with
extremely ill patients.6 Generally, a transfer should not be
undertaken until the patient has been resuscitated and stabi-
lized. Deﬁcient stabilization of respiratory and hemodynamic
functions and deﬁcient evaluation of possible potential deteri-
oration during transfer after initial stabilization, in addition to
deﬁcient tools and medicines for resuscitation were evident in
this study and were more important than incorrect medications
concerning poisoning severity and mortality. However, poorly
designed health systems and deﬁcits of training and equipment
do not exempt the primary physician from his responsibility to
provide the essential medical care to the patient according to
the available facilities until arrival to the receiving hospital.7
This study found a signiﬁcant correlation between the
severity of the cases and the time delay till delivery of the prop-
er management. This is in agreement with Ramesha et al.,
(2009) who reported that, time lapse had a signiﬁcant role in
the mortality in cases of acute poisoning.8
This study also revealed inappropriate management re-
ceived in the referring hospitals either in the form of use of
incorrect medications (40 cases = 50.6%), omission of ﬁrst
aid measures (17 cases = 21.5%) or faulty decontamination
or resuscitation maneuvers (12 cases = 15.2%). Similar ﬁnd-
ings were found by Lall and colleagues in 2003 who studied
the proﬁle of acute poisoning cases presenting to health centers
and hospitals in Oman for one year and concluded that diag-
nostic and treatment facilities at primary care level were inad-
equate. The facilities for toxicological screening, monitoring
drugs blood levels and supply of important antidotes were
not available as well in the secondary level hospitals. Gastriclavage without restriction or protection for all cases of poison-
ing including kerosene ingestion was carried out at both pri-
mary and secondary care levels.9
Grossly deﬁcient basic and critical care knowledge and
skills were evidently responsible for the undue long delay
and faulty decontamination and resuscitative measures which
resulted in higher mortality. False concept of the use of salty
water for emesis and unprotected gastric lavage were responsi-
ble for complications and fatal outcome in patients who would
have been otherwise easily cured with simple management.
Actually, fatal hypernatremia resulted in death of two patients
who seemingly suffered mild poisoning with neuroleptics or
antidepressants (in one of them serum Na+ level reached
181 mmol/L).
Atropine was found to be the most prevalent drug to be
inappropriately given. Iatrogenic atropine poisoning had oc-
curred in several cases with organophosphorus insecticide poi-
soning to whom atropine was improperly given in huge
unjustiﬁed doses (reaching 70 mg in one case). This may be
due to an improper use of therapeutic guidelines of atropiniza-
tion in case of organophosphorus insecticide poisoning by
erroneously using fully dilated and unreactive pupils as the
endpoint of treatment rather than dried pulmonary secretions
and adequate oxygenation.10
The aim of transferring a critically ill patient to a tertiary
referral center is to improve prognosis, so the transport itself
must be as safe as possible and should not pose additional
risks.11 Hence, transfers should be effected through the re-
quired qualiﬁed personnel and transportation equipments
including the necessary and medically appropriate life support
measures. Physician’s supervision on the transportation pro-
cess is crucial for immediate intervention if any adverse event
occurs, thus helping to prevent many complications during
transportation.12
This study showed multiple deﬁciencies in transportation as
ambulance was not used for transportation despite its avail-
ability in the referring hospital. In addition, absence of an
accompanying supervising physician with critical cases and
deﬁciencies in the essential equipment for basic life support
were evident in cases transported by ambulance. Many cases
suffered unassisted major life threats as respiratory failure,
shock, arrhythmias and severe electrolyte and metabolic dis-
turbances. These ﬁndings are in accordance with Ligtenberg
et al. (2005) who studied the quality of inter-hospital transport
of 100 critical cases and found that 50% of adverse events
which occurred during transportation were attributed to igno-
rance of the recommendations given by the intensive care spe-
cialist for safe transport of the patient. They estimated that
70% of events could have been avoided by better preparation
for the transfer. Approximately 30% of events were attributed
to technical problems during transport some of which could
have been prevented (e.g. shortage of oxygen on the road).11
The inability to provide an available ambulance for transfer
of 37 out of 79 (46.8%) patients indicates a severe deﬁciency of
administrative protocols and standard operating procedures
required for a comprehensive inter-hospital transfer service.
Non equipped ambulance represented another challenge to
the secure transfer though considered less frequent. The multi-
plicity of transportation errors strongly and signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with poison severity score grades clarifying the gained
risks by inappropriate erroneous transportation on mortality
and complications.
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not used because it was not available. This indicates a major
need to increase the health care resources in the rural areas
to meet the essential needs during emergencies.
The non-provision of referral documents was striking in
our series (69 out of 79 referred patients). This reﬂects negli-
gence from the referring physicians and unsupervised emer-
gency care system. Discrepancies and deﬁciencies in
documentation of drug therapy and other important aspects
of care occur commonly in all care settings and were found
to account for at least 10% of errors in pediatric inpatients.13
The insufﬁcient documentation of transfer was also re-
ported by Craig, (2005) who found incomplete transfer infor-
mation in 37% of the transferred patients during the study
period.14 In a survey of 54 Victorian public health services
about inter-hospital patient transfer, conducted in November
2007, the documentation process was a major problem raised
by the health services. Some cases were transferred with poor,
illegible or no documentation, and variable forms for docu-
mentation of transfer process were used.15 This indicates the
need to increase the physician’s awareness of the value of doc-
umentation in case of consultation or referral to other special-
ists. Since negligent documentation might expose the critical
patients to deﬁcient care measures and or delay in provision
of his due basic standard care, malpractice might be considered
in these instances and claim against physicians, hospital or the
emergency care system might result.
No signiﬁcant differences in PSS grades on arrival to the
PTC existed between cases referred from hospitals inside Cairo
and those from other distant departments suggesting that nei-
ther the distance nor duration of transfer had any role on poi-
soning severity. This is conﬁrmed by Ligtenberg and
colleagues, (2005)11 who found no correlation between dis-
tance and patient’s condition on arrival to ICU. This conﬁrms
that inter-facility transfer toward a specializing center is bene-
ﬁcial regardless the distance or duration of transfer.
A comprehensive inter-hospital (or inter-facility) transfer
service requires administrative protocols to provide continuous
patient ﬂow during transport and to deal with challenges the
transfer may pose. Standard operating procedures are recom-
mended to address such issues. Optimally, decisions regarding
transfer protocols, procedures, practice of transport personnel
and inter-hospital agreement should be made prior to trans-
fer.16 Strikingly, none of the cases in this study was transferred
according to a speciﬁc protocol or following special precau-
tions and recommendations during transfer or inter-hospital
agreement with the PTC. This suggests a poorly designed
emergency health system that lacks harmony, coordination
and strict regulations. In addition, the rising rate of claims
of medical malpractice in Egypt encouraged the transfer of
critically ill poisoned patients without indications, precautions
or appropriate inter-hospital transfer protocols.4.1. Limitation of this study
This study is limited by the retrospective record-based nature
and the lack of documentation from the referring hospitals
in most cases. In addition, the outcome of the cases can be
attributed to several factors other than the conditions of trans-
port (as the critical state of the case, the occurrence of adverseevents during transport) which cannot be excluded in this
study.
5. Conclusions
The numerous deﬁcits encountered in this study are related to
poorly-designed emergency care systems including ignored
continued medical education and training, negligent emer-
gency medicine practice and unsuccessful scientiﬁc communi-
cations with the PTC.
6. Recommendations
The provision of emergency care and advanced transfer system
including equipped ambulance vehicle escorted with competent
health care providers are of paramount importance. This can
be achieved by well-designed and supervised emergency care
and transfer protocols.
Better preparation and communication with the PTC be-
fore transfer are of great importance for careful assessment
of cases in acute poisoning as this may help to avoid inappro-
priate management as well as risky and unnecessary transfer.
Training programs for primary health care physicians to im-
prove knowledge and practice in diagnosis and treatment of
poisoning cases are needed. Due to regional differences in
the incidence of poisoning, these programs should be tailored
to regional needs and available facilities. Medical authorities
in Egypt should participate in ensuring safe inter-hospital pa-
tient transfer through strict regulations that determine the
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